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ALDEN V. MAINE AND THE WEB OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
William D. Araiza*
In Alden v. Maine,1 the Supreme Court held that states were
immune from private party lawsuits in state court seeking back pay
against their state government employer. 2 Of course, Alden's consequences extend much farther than the Fair Labor Standards Act3
(FLSA), the statute authorizing the lawsuits disallowed in Alden.
Alden enunciated a broad rule that state governments enjoy a constitutionally-based immunity from private party lawsuits seeking retrospective relief for violations of federal law when those lawsuits are
brought in state court. It finished the job started by Seminole Tribe v.
Florida,4 which refused to read Article I as granting Congress the
power to abrogate state sovereign immunity from suits in federal
court when that suit sought retrospective relief.5 Thus, Alden extended Seminole Tribe's state immunity shield against federally-6
created causes of action to include suits brought in state court.
When combined with the holdings and analysis in the two Florida
Prepaidcases announced the same day as Alden,7 the result is a significant expansion of state sovereign immunity. Indeed, taken together, Alden and the FloridaPrepaidcases (which limited two other
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. The author wishes
to thank Daniel Selmi for his very helpful comments on an earlier version of
this draft and Danielle Gerber for research assistance.
1. 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
2. See id. at 2246.
3. The Fair Labor Standards Act purported to authorize these lawsuits.
See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 16, 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1994); Fair Labor
Standards Amendments of 1974 § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1994).
4. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
5. See id. at 47.
6. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2246.
7. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say.
Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999); College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999).
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methods by which states could be sued for retrospective relief) 8 make
such retrospective relief nearly unobtainable at
the behest of private
9
circumstance.
limited
very
one
in
save
parties,
Justice Stevens's dissent in Seminole Tribe argued that the immunity thus conferred on states would have wide-ranging consequences for the enforcement of a variety of federal rights, from those
based on copyright and patent law to those concerning bankruptcy
and environmental law.10 Even after Seminole Tribe, though, it was
thought-or perhaps just assumed-that such rights could continue
to be enforced against states through the mechanism of suing states
in their own courts." Alden's extension to state courts of Seminole
Tribe's prohibition on retrospective relief thus requires careful consideration of Justice Stevens's statement. With state courts now
subject to essentially the same state immunity rules as Article III
courts, it is appropriate to begin assessing the damage that has been
done to the enforcement of federal rights and to examine whether
that damage is federalism's necessary price.
This paper attempts such a preliminary damage assessment tour
by examining Alden's-and Seminole Tribe's-effect on federal environmental law. It begins by attempting to place Alden within the
structural constitutional law created by the Supreme Court-law significantly altered in recent years. The two structural doctrines most
relevant to Alden's effect on environmental law are, of course, federalism, discussed in Part I, but also separation of powers, specifically,
8. In particular, College Savings Bank overruled the doctrine under which
states were thought to have implicitly waived their sovereign immunity from
suits alleging violations of statutes enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause
simply by engaging in interstate commerce. See College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct.
at 2228-29. FloridaPrepaidlimited Congress's ability to abrogate state sovereign immunity by means of legislating pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. It did so by imposing significant hurdles for a statute to be
considered a legitimate use of Congress's Section 5 authority. See Flordia
Prepaid,119 S. Ct. at 2207.
9. The remaining circumstance appears to be limited to where Congress
has validly legislated pursuant to its power to enforce the Civil War Amendments. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267; Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,
59 (1996); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,455-56 (1976).
10. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 77 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh Amendment,
and the PotentialEviscerationofEx parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 495, 503
& n.39 (1997).
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the law of standing, which is discussed in Part II. The Court has
used both of these doctrines to restrict the ability of private parties to
vindicate federal rights, while enshrining more static and less politically flexible relationships between different parts of the government. 12 They both relate to environmental law because the Court's
recent restrictions on standing have called into question the ability of
plaintiffs to seek certain types of relief in certain circumstances, exactly when the Court's federalism jurisprudence has led to other,
sometimes conflicting, limits being imposed on private parties seeking to sue states. 13 Parts I and II attempt to make sense of these
sometimes cross-cutting requirements and to analyze their impact on
plaintiffs' attempts to vindicate federal law.
After this attempt to place Alden within the context of the current Court's constitutional structure jurisprudence, the paper moves
on, in Part III, to consider Alden's impact on environmental law. Before reaching its main focus, Part III addresses a preliminary question about the availability of even prospective relief. In Seminole
Tribe, the Court, after concluding that Congress had no Article I
power to abrogate state sovereign immunity from private lawsuits
seeking damages, considered whether the plaintiffs in that case could
bring their suit as one seeking prospective relief under the doctrine of
Exparte Young. 14 The Court rejected that attempt, finding that Congress in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA)' 5 had displaced
the Young cause of action with a statutorily-specific one. 16 The first
portion of Part Ill asks whether this exception to the otherwise general availability of Young relief against states applies also to suits
brought in state court. In other words, does Alden adopt Seminole
Tribe's analysis concerning the availability of Young relief? And if
it does (as this paper suggests that it might), do the remedial schemes
found in federal environmental statutes displace Young, just as
the remedial scheme in the IGRA displaced Young in

12. See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997); Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
13. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
14. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
15. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721
(1994); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168 (1994).
16. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74-76 (1996).
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Seminole Tribe? This paper suggests that the remedies in environmental law should not be viewed as having that sort of displacing effect.
Having decided that private environmental lawsuits against
states in state court can go forward at least to the extent that they are
cast as Young suits, Part III then goes on to consider the impact of
Alden's holding that the Constitution prohibits Congress from
authorizing private parties to sue states in state courts on federal law
causes of action seeking retrospective relief such as damages. The
main question here is how much damage to federal environmental
law is done by the restriction on suits for retrospective relief brought
by private parties. After examining the importance of retrospective
relief and private party litigation, Part III concludes that, depending
on the statute, Alden's limitations may not be extraordinary, but will
probably impact state compliance with federal environmental law in
more than trivial ways.
Part IV considers judicial and legislative responses to Alden.
One response to Alden's immunity rule is simply to limit it, along
lines already visible in other aspects of federalism law. Specifically,
the Court has at times explicitly balanced federal and state interests
when determining whether the federally-created burden or liability
can be imposed on the state. Part IV asks first whether this balancing
can be extended to the limitation Alden recognizes as absolute: the
prohibition on private party suits seeking retrospective relief from
states for federal law violations based on sources of authority other
than the Civil War Amendments. 17 Can courts hope to determine
when the federal interest in statutory enforcement beyond that allowed by Alden is so important as to trump the immunity found in
Alden? Past experience with such balancing suggests that this approach will fail.
Part IV then considers legislative responses. Beyond its Article
I-based power to enact environmental laws, Congress also has the
spending power, which has been used in the past to attach to federal
grants to states conditions that could not have been legislated.
17. The Civil War Amendments have historically been viewed as so limiting state autonomy as to justify congressional creation of private rights of action for retrospective relief against states. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445, 455-56 (1976).
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Federal grants can impose such conditions, subject to (thus far) relatively deferential review by the Court. The spending power may thus
allow Congress to reach the result denied it in Alden. Another source
of congressional leverage is its power to delegate administration of
federal environmental law to the states. State administration of federal regulatory programs-so-called "cooperative federalism"--both
relieves the federal government of enforcement burdens while involving state governments in important regulatory programs and allowing the states to tailor implementation of those programs to local
needs and pressures. As a condition of such delegations, Congress
should be able to require that states waive their immunity from suit.
Such conditions make logical sense and should be able to pass constitutional muster since they are logically related to the delegation
decision and not so coercive as to present the state with no realistic
choice.
I.

ALDEN AND THE NEW LAW OF FEDERALISM

It is a commonplace observation that the Supreme Court is rewriting the law of federalism. Between 1992 and 1999, the Court
decided at least seven significant cases dealing either with the scope
of federal power over states, or, in the case of United States v. Lopez, 18 with the scope of federal power over private activities traditionally regulated by states. 19 Thus, before examining Alden's impact on environmental law, it is necessary to consider its place in the
overall scheme of the Court's new federalism.
One way to view the recent federalism cases is as erecting a
constitutional barrier to federal attempts to make states accountable
to federal authority. The most obvious examples of this idea are the
commandeering cases, New York v. United States20 and Printz, with
their focus on the federal "commandeering" of state government
18. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
19. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999); College Sav. Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999);
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 119
S. Ct. 2199 (1999); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997); Printz
v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); New York v. United

States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
20. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).

1518

LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW

[Vol. 33:1513

institutions.21 The same theme is visible in the Court's state sovereign immunity jurisprudence, which until Alden had focused on a
state's immunity from suit in federal courts. 22 This is not a new concept: the Ex parte Young fiction, for example, is based on the supposed distinction between a plaintiff seeking relief against a state and
a plaintiff seeking relief against a state official. However, the
Court's elaboration of that distinction, in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene
Tribe,23 to mean something more than the simple line between prospective and retrospective relief,24 indicates that the Court is applying that distinction aggressively, protecting state governments
against an assertion of federal court authority against them, even
when a formalistic application of Young would suggest that the
plaintiffs suit could go forward. Even the Court's now-abandoned
National League of Cities v. Usery 25 jurisprudence could be fitted
within this conception of state sovereignty, with that doctrine's requirement that the challenged statute regulate "States as States" 26 and
27
impact its ability to perform "traditional governmental functions."
Alden does not fit as easily within this scheme of direct federal
regulation. The law itself-the FLSA---does not directly regulate
state political processes, 28 either at the enforcement or the legislative
21. But see Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666, 671-72 (2000) (rejecting
commandeering argument against statute limiting the sale of driver's license
information).
22. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99
(1984) ("A State's constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely
whether it may be sued, but where it may be sued."); Employees of the Dep't
of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S.
279, 294 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring in the result) (noting the basis of
Eleventh Amendment issues in "the problems of federalism inherent in making
one sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the other").
23. 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
24. The prospective/retrospective relief line was explicitly embraced by the
Court in Edelman v. Jordan,415 U.S. 651 (1974).
25. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
26. Id. at 854.
27. Id. at 852; see also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981) (citing NationalLeague of Cities).
28. Of course, during the period in which National League of Cities was
good law, particular applications of the FLSA were challengeable by states as
intruding on their Tenth Amendment prerogatives. But the Court's analysis in
Alden does not turn on whether a particular application of the statute to a state
would fail the NationalLeague of Cities test; instead, it rejects any attempt to
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level, and the case deals with a state's immunity from suit in its own
courts, not the courts of the federal government. Of course, the law
sought to be applied against the state originates with the federal government. But in Alden the federal law does not directly command
state governments in the same way as did the statutes in the commandeering cases, nor is a burden directly imposed on a state by a
federal court. Instead, there is the mediating influence of the state
court, which presumably should be seen as mitigating the impact on
whatever sovereignty interest the state has. Indeed, given that the
federal policy is by definition the state policy,29 it is difficult to see
how the sovereignty interest of the state is compromised when its
30
compliance with that policy is judged by its own court.
Nevertheless, Alden establishes that there is little practical dif31
ference between subjecting a state to suit in federal or state court.
Since it is now constitutionally irrelevant that the state is being sued
in federal as opposed to state court, understanding state sovereign
immunity requires shifting the focus from the character of the forum
to the character of the state. Clearly, there is something unique about
the nature of the state-again, as opposed to the nature of the forum
in which it is being sued-that requires immunity. This new development in the constitutional structure of federalism 32 may be analogous to new developments in another constitutional structural area:
the separation of powers and, specifically, standing doctrine. Before
seek retrospective relief against a state for violations of the statute. Cf Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1985) (collecting
cases where lower courts attempted to determine, under National League of
Cities, which state functions were constitutionally immune from federal regulation).
29. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 392 (1947) (citing Mondou v. New
York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912) (federal policy
imputed to state government)).
30. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2289 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting).
31. As Justice Souter noted in dissent, the Alden decision essentially renders reliance on the Eleventh Amendment superfluous, as a background principle of state sovereign immunity does the important constitutional work. See id.
at 2269 (Souter, J., dissenting).
32. The Alden majority argues that its rule of state sovereign immunity is
consistent with, among other things, the Framers' intent. See id. at 2247-63.
The novelty of the development lies in the fact that Alden represents the first
time that the Court squarely confronted this issue.
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examining Alden's effect on environmental law, this Article will now
briefly examine the Supreme Court's new standing jurisprudence.
That new jurisprudence, by restricting certain types of lawsuits
seeking injunctive relief, may significantly influence Alden's ultimate impact on environmental law.
I. ALDEN AND THENEW LAW OF STANDING

In order to place Alden within the context of structural constitutional law, it becomes necessary to also consider the law of standing,
specifically, the law of citizen standing to enforce federal law. During the last decade the Court has significantly limited the scope of
private lawsuits seeking to ensure that other private parties, states, or
the federal government itself, comply with federal law.
A. The Court'sRecent StandingJurisprudence
The Court's recent limits on standing began in earnest in 1992,
with Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.3 3 The plaintiffs in Defenders of

Wildlife challenged a decision of the Interior Department not to require other governmental agencies to consult with the department
about the environmental effects of their actions when those actions
took place on foreign territory. 34 In support of their standing argument, the plaintiffs alleged that they were researchers interested in
studying certain species living in foreign countries that might become extinct as a result of U.S. government action. 35 The Court
found this basis for standing inadequate, in light of the absence of
facts indicating that the plaintiffs had concrete plans, e.g., a plane
ticket, to visit the areas where the species lived.36 A plurality also
questioned whether any injunction requiring the Interior Department
to abide by the law-in this case, to insist that all government agencies consult with it about the environmental effects of their actionswould in fact redress any injury that
the plaintiffs might suffer from
37
having the species become extinct.
33. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
34. See id. at 558-59.

35. See id. at 562-63.
36. See id. at 563-64.
37. See id. at 568-71. Justices Kennedy and Souter, who provided the fifth
and sixth votes for the rest of the opinion, did not join in the discussion of re-
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But most important for our purposes, the Court refused to find in
the statute's citizen-suit provision 38 a "procedural right" to have government comply with the law. 39 According to the Court, deprivation
of such a right amounted to a generalized grievance and thus did not
provide the type of particularized injury necessary for Article III
standing.4 0 Instead, such a lawsuit, lacking a foundation of a particularized injury suffered by the plaintiff, amounted to abstract enforcement of the laws by courts, acting at the behest of private parties. 41 To the majority, this constituted an inappropriate delegation to
the courts of the President's Article II authority to execute the laws.42
The Court's restriction on standing continued in Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Environment.43 In Steel Company the Court
held that the plaintiffs in a suit under the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA)44 did not have
standing to sue a company that failed to provide timely reports of
toxic discharges, as required by the statute, when the company corrected the omission, albeit tardily.45 For our purposes, the important
point about the Court's analysis is its holding that a request for fines,
to be paid to the Treasury as called for in the statute, did not redress
any injury the plaintiffs may have suffered. For the Court, such a request suffered from an analogous flaw as the Defenders of Wildlife
plaintiffs' claim of a "procedural injury." As the Steel Company
Court put it:
although a suitor may derive great comfort and joy from the
fact that the United States Treasury is not cheated, that a
dressability.
38. Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 11, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994).
39. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 571-78.
40. See id. at 573-74.
41. See id. at 576-77.
42. See id. at 577.
To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in
executive officers' compliance with the law into an "individual right"
vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the
President to the courts the Chief Executive's most important constitutional duty, to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."
Id.
43. 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 11046 (1986).
45. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 86-88, 109.
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wrongdoer gets his just desserts, or that the Nation's laws
are faithfully enforced, that psychic satisfaction is not an
acceptable Article EII remedy46 because it does not redress a
cognizable Article III injury.
Two cases before the Court this Term raise very similar issues.
The first, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.,4 7 raises the same analysis as in Steel Company, but in the
slightly different context of mootness. In Laidlaw, citizen plaintiffs
again sued a corporation alleged to have violated environmental
laws, i.e., this time, the Clean Water Act. 48 In this case, the trial
court, while finding past violations, also found that the defendant had
substantially complied with the statute for several years, and thus denied the request for declaratory and injunctive relief. The court's
findings left only the plaintiffs' claims for penalties to be paid, as in
Steel Company, to the Treasury. Following Steel Company, the
Fourth Circuit held that the lawsuit was moot, explaining that the
plaintiffs no longer had standing because the civil penalties requested
would not redress any injury suffered by the plaintiffs.49 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that such penalties might well redress
ongoing or future violations, due to their deterrent effect 50 The
Court distinguished Steel Company on the ground that that case did
not feature any allegation of ongoing or imminent violations and that
"no basis for such an allegation appeared to exist." 51 By contrast,

46. Id. at 107.
47. 120 S. Ct. 693 (2000).
48. See id. at 701-02; see also Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972 § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1999).

49. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 149 F.3d
303, 306-07 (4th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 120 S.Ct. 693 (2000).
50. See Laidlaw, 120 S.Ct. at 700. To be precise, the appellate court as-

sumed that the plaintiffs had standing, but then concluded that the case was
moot, based on an inquiry that was explicitly modeled on the standing question. See Laidlaw, 149 F.3d at 306-07. The Supreme Court concluded, first,
that the plaintiffs did have standing and then held that the mootness inquiry,
though related, was distinct from the standing inquiry. See Laidlaw, 120 S.Ct.
at 707-09. The Court then concluded that the case was not moot, at least as the
record had been presented to the Court. See id. at 710-11.
51. Laidlaw, 120 S.Ct. at 707 (citing Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 108).
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in Laidlaw the 52
plaintiffs had made allegations of ongoing or immiviolations.
nent
Another case before the Court potentially raises an even greater
threat to the concept of citizen suits. In United States ex rel. Stevens
v. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources,53 the Second Circuit up54
held the constitutionality of a qui tam action against a state agency.
The Court originally granted certiorari to determine whether a state
was a "person" within the False Claims Act that authorized the qui
tam action, and if so, whether such suits against unconsenting states
violated the Eleventh Amendment. Several months after the grant,
however, the Court ordered the parties to brief the question whether
"a private person [has] standing under Article III to litigate claims of
fraud upon the government." 55 The Court's interest in this issue, not
addressed by the appellate court, 56 raises the specter of close scrutiny
of the entire concept of qui tam actions, and thus close scrutiny of all
types of suits in which citizens are enlisted to vindicate federal law.
B. Alden and the New Law of Standing
Where does this new, more restricted, standing law leave our
examination of Alden? While Alden is concerned with state immunity, and thus not with standing per se, nevertheless the skepticism.
the Court has shown about citizen standing percolates into Alden's
grant of immunity to the states. By restricting to other governmental
entities the ability to sue in order to "punish" state wrongdoing by
means of retrospective penalties, or to compensate victims of such
wrongdoing, Alden-and for that matter Seminole Tribe-can be
read as embracing the same structural concerns animating cases like
52. Seeid. at711.
53. 162 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. granted,119 S. Ct. 2391 (1999).
54. See id. at 198.
55. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens,
120 S.Ct. 523, 523 (1999) (mem.). The order was issued on November 19,
1999, while the original grant of certiorari was dated June 24, 1999.
56. Judge Weinstein dissented from the decision, allowing the lawsuit to
proceed, but only on Eleventh Amendment grounds. He did, however, suggest
that "[False Claims Act] qui tam suits stand on shaky constitutional ground
with respect to the principle of separation of powers as embodied in Article H's
Appointments and Take Care Clauses and Article III's standing requirements."
United States ex rel. Stevens, 162 F.3d at 219 (Weinstein, J., sitting by designation, dissenting).
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Defenders of Wildlife and Steel Company. In particular, these two
doctrines converge at the point of imposing structure-based limits on
private law enforcement. Just like Defenders of Wildlife and Steel
Company disapprove of private parties invoking courts to take over
the role of "pure" enforcers of federal law, i.e., enforcers of federal
law with no concrete self-interest that can be vindicated by a federal
court, so too Alden and Seminole Tribe disapprove of private parties
punishing state non-compliance with federal law. In both situations
the Court has reserved enforcement power to a government entity;
the executive branch in the standing cases, 57
and the federal or state
government in the sovereign immunity cases.
The Court's decisions in-these cases reflect the thought that law
enforcement in these situations implicates structural concerns about
the appropriate law enforcer. The standing cases prohibit Congress
from deputizing private parties as enforcers of federal law beyond
their personal stake in the controversy, 58 while the sovereign immunity cases prohibit even injured private parties from suing the state
itself, either formally or in essence. 59 Somebody else-the government-has those jobs, and the reason is based in structure. In the
standing cases, the structural concern is the executive's sole authority
to execute federal law. 60 In the sovereign immunity cases, the issue
focuses on the uniqueness of the state as a defendant, given the
uniqueness of states as sovereign entities.
Of course, state sovereign immunity is not absolute: states and
the federal government can sue states, while private parties can sue
state officials under certain circumstances. The Court has explained
the first of these limitations as a consequence of the unique nature of
the federal system, with its two levels of sovereignty. Thus, the idea
L

57. A similar concern provides one of the lines of reasoning leading the
Court in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), to strike down federal
"commandeering" of state law .enforcement resources. Justice Scalia expressed concern that such law enforcement commandeering would place the
enforcement of federal law in the hands of'individuals beyond the control of
the executive. See id. at 922.
58. This rule even goes so far as to require the plaintiff to demonstrate
standing for each form of relief sought. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 693, 706 (2000).
59. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100-02
(1984).
60. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576-77 (1992).
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of a national government ultimately supreme over the states requires
that the federal government be able to sue states to ensure their compliance with federal law.6 1 This power is nothing more than another
version of the power asserted by the Supreme Court in Martin v.
Hunter'sLessee62 to review state court interpretations of federal law;
in both situations, the federal government seeks to ensure that the
state government honors federal law. The rule that states can be sued
by other states 63 is justified as a means of ensuring a peaceful and
orderly resolution of disputes between sovereign states.64
The rule-explicated most famously in Ex parte Young 6 5 -that
private parties can sue state officials for certain types of relief derives from a distinct structural provision, the role of courts in providing remedies for deprivations of rights. This is as basic a structural idea as the concern that the executive branch is responsible for
enforcing the law.66 In Marbury v. Madison,67 for example, the conclusion that Marbury had a right to the commission as a magistrate
provided the basis for Chief Justice Marshall's conclusion that the
executive branch was amenable to suit in order to vindicate that
right.68 Allowing prospective relief makes a remedy available in
every case in which there is a right. This allows a federal court to
play its traditional role of vindicator of federal rights, at the behest of
an injured plaintiff, a role cited-in a more general form-by Defenders of Wildlife in defense of its refusal to allow federal courts to
enforce compliance with federal
law in the absence of a plaintiff suf69
fering a particularized injury.

61. See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 329 (1934).

62. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
- ....
63. See Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468,
487 (1987).
64. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240,2267 (1999).
65. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

66. For a discussion of the historichl origins of this idea, see Ned Miltenberg, The RevolutionaryRight to a Remedy, TRIAL, Mar. 1998, at 48.
67. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

68. See id. at 166 ("where a specific duty is assigned by law [to an executive branch official], and individual rights depend upon the performance of that
duty, it seems... clear that the individual who considers himself injured, has a
right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy").

69. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 576-77.
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The important point here is that structure-understood as the
proper role of particular institutions in the governing process-can
provide explanations for both Young and Defenders of Wildlife. Perhaps more interestingly, recent trends in both areas have moved in
the same direction, away from a more fluid, flexible conception of
institutional roles and toward stricter formulas. In the standing context, the Defenders of Wildlife Court rejected the idea that citizen
standing could be viewed as the price Congress exacts for broad
delegations to agencies, a built-in check on the otherwise broad discretion provided in many statutory grants.70 By contrast, the Defenders of Wildlife Court embraced a more rigid conception of standing.
The Court required not only injury, but injury so concrete and particularized that the majority both required the researchers concerned
about possible extinctions to have a plane ticket to the areas where
the species lived, and rejected a standing theory that focused on the
professional interests of the plaintiffs in observing and studying the
threatened species. 71
Similarly, the Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence has
gone a long way toward rejecting the theory, embraced in Garcia,
that the political process provides the main protection for state interests at the federal level. That theory, which characterizes sovereign
immunity as based on common law (and thus, defeasible) 72 and requires merely a plain legislative statement before Congress will be
considered to have abrogated it, reflects a more fluid, politicallyresponsive immunity, as opposed to the constitutionally-based and
thus unabridgable immunity enshrined in Alden.
These trends toward more rigid rules clearly will impact federal
environmental regulation. Sovereign immunity is obviously relevant, to the extent the state is either an environmental violator, and
perhaps even to the extent that the state administers the federal
70. See id. at 603-05 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Cass R. Sunstein,
What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91
MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992) (arguing that, historically, courts have played a
broader role in ensuring compliance with law than suggested by the majority

opinion in Defenders of Wildlife).
71. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 565-67.

72. See generally Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2269 (Souter, J., dissenting) (illustrating that the Constitution's capacity to order relationships has changed since
this country's founding).
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program under a scheme of cooperative federalism. The standing
rules become important in the sovereign immunity analysis because
the Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence has drawn an important distinction concerning the type of relief available against a state,
while at the same time it has decided standing issues, especially in
environmental cases, in a way that limits the extent to which certain
types of relief will support a plaintiffs standing. Thus, the similar
trends in these two areas converge. Alden's completion of Seminole
Tribe's restriction on Congress's Article I-based abrogation power
provides an appropriate opportunity to assess what this convergence
means for federal regulation in general, and environmental law in
particular.
The next section of this Article discusses the impact Alden, and
the sovereign immunity rule it enshrines, may have on environmental
regulation.
III. ALDEN AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
It seems clear that Alden does not affect the ability of private
party plaintiffs to seek forward-looking relief, such as an injunction,
when sought against state officials. v3 While the Alden Court does not
explicitly say so, its analysis suggests that it does not distinguish, at
least for the most part, between state and federal courts when considering the source of the state's constitutional immunity and the
strength of its interest in that immunity.74 If the source of the immunity is the same for claims of immunity from federal and state court
actions, then so should the scope and limitations of that immunity.
Logically, then, Alden's effect is simply to equate federal and state
court immunity, with the result that damages and other retrospective

73. See id. at 2267.
74. The Court does provide some discussion,of the specific issue of state
sovereign immunity from federal law-based lawsuits commenced in state
courts. See id. at 2257-66. But, even much of this discussion applies to the
general issue of sovereign immunity, applicable regardless of whether the suit
is brought in federal or state court. Cf id. at 2269 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the result in Alden made the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe v.
Florida,517 U.S. 44 (1996), superfluous, as Alden's broad Tenth Amendmentbased immunity includes Seminole Tribe's narrower conception of immunity,

based on the implications of the Eleventh Amendment).
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relief are generally75 not available at the behest of a private plaintiff
against a non-consenting 76 state, regardless of whether the suit is
brought in federal or state court.
A. The Availability of ProspectiveRelief After Alden
1. Relief against the state as regulator
State sovereign immunity jurisprudence, now seemingly made
applicable to actions brought in state court, does not make a completely hard and fast distinction between prospective relief, which is
allowed, and retrospective relief, which is not allowed. For example,
the Court has held that where relief runs against the state, its nature
as prospective is irrelevant. An obvious instance of such an uncon77
stitutional lawsuit is one in which the state is sued in its own name.
But even lawsuits that seek only prospective relief against state officials may run afoul of this rule. For example, in Idaho v. Coeur
d'Alene Tribe,78 a majority of the Court concluded that the relief
sought-a judicial declaration that the plaintiff Indian tribe owned
certain land claimed by the state as its own and injunctive relief preventing state officials from exercising the state's authority over itso impacted the state's sovereignty as to run against the state, in violation of Young. 79 While there was a dispute within the majority
over proper application of Young, 80 there was a majority for the
proposition that the declaratory relief requested by the tribe was not
75 But see supra note 9 (noting the continued availability of such relief when
Congress legislates under its power to enforce the Civil War Amendments).
76. In a case decided the same day as Alden, the Court significantly narrowed the conception of state consent to suits in federal court. See College
Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct.
2219 (1999) (overruling the theory of constructive waiver articulated in
Parden v. TerminalRailway, 377 U.S. 184 (1964)).
77. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,
100-01 (1984) (citing cases).
78. 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
79. See id. at 265. The lawsuit originally named both the state of Idaho and
several officials, but the claims against the state were rejected by lower federal
courts and not considered by the Supreme Court. See id.
80. Compare id. at 269-70 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) with id.
at 291-96 (O'Connor, J, joined by Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
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proper Young-type relief, as it was equivalent to a request for a quiet
title declaration and thus implicated the state's interests, not just
those of the state officials. 81 A majority of the Court saw such relief
as implicating too intimately the state's own interests to constitute
proper relief under Young.
While courts interpreting Coeur d'Alene have characterized the
facts as quite unusual,82 imaginative state government attorneys
could seek to stretch that holding to cover situations where the environmental law results could be significant. For example, a claim that
the state, through its officers, was illegally polluting the environment
probably would not so implicate state sovereignty interests as to
come within the scope of Coeur d'Alene's rule. But what about a
claim that a state was not properly implementing a federal environmental statute? The Clean Air Act, for example, authorizes states to
implement the statute's requirements by promulgating and administering a State Implementation Plan (SIp). 83 The citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act allows suits against states for failure to
regulate. 84 Would a judicial decision accepting such a claim and requiring changes in the state's enforcement of the SIP so implicate the
autonomy and integrity of the state's regulatory authority as to in effect enjoin the state itself-as opposed to its officers-from acting in
a certain way?
What makes such an injunction at least potentially problematic
is the character of the challenged government action; that is, government acting as a regulator, not as a generator of pollution like any
private party. It should be noted that prior cases have not drawn such
a line. In Edelman v. Jordan,85 for example, while the Court disallowed the relief sought, it did so on the ground that the relief sought
was retrospective and thus ran against the state,,not because the state
81. See id. at 281-88 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.); see also id.
at 289-91, 296-97 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
82. See, e.g., Froebel v. Meyer, 13 F. Supp. 2d 843, 854 (E.D. Wis. 1998)
(characterizing the facts of Coeur d'Alene as "extraordinary").
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1999).
84. See, e.g., American Lung Ass'n v. Kean, 871 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1989)
(holding that the Clean Air Act authorized private parties to sue a state to compel it to promulgate and enforce ozone emissions regulations).
85. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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was acting as a regulator (in that case, an administrator of a social
welfare program).86 Similarly, in College Savings Bank the state was
acting like a market participant, marketing a financial instrument to
private parties, and the Court held that retrospective relief was inappropriate.87 The Court explicitly rejected the argument that the charit less like a state under
acter of the state's action merited treating
88
analysis.
Amendment
Eleventh
normal
This analysis suggests that a suit against the state seeking an injunction requiring changes in its implementation of its SIP could go
forward. But one cannot be too sure. It is true that the Court's concern for suits implicating the state qua state (as opposed to state officials) relates not to the character of the conduct that is being regulated, but rather to the nature of the interests implicated by the relief:
an injunction against a state official (acceptable under Young) versus
an injunction requiring the state to divest itself of sovereign control
over a given piece of territory (unacceptable under Coeur d'Alene).
But there is not a clean line between acceptable prospective relief
that necessarily affects how the state regulates and unconstitutional
prospective relief of the type sought in Coeur d'Alene.89 A Court
that is seeking to protect states more than they have been protected
before could easily conclude that an injunction requiring the state to
enforce its SIP more stringently "falls on the Eleventh Amendment
side of the line." 90 This is especially true given the Court's recent
solicitude for protecting the integrity of state governmental processes, as reflected in its "commandeering" jurisprudence. 9 ' While
federal limitations and controls on the state's administration of a federal regulatory program would probably survive a commandeering
challenge, given the voluntary nature of the state's participation in
,

r"

86. See id. at 677.
87. See College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219,2230-31 (1999).
88. See id.
89. See, e.g., Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 281 ("the 'difference between the
type of relief barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that permitted under Ex
parte Young will not in many instances be that between day and night"')
(quoting Edelman, 415 U.S. at 667).
90. Coeurd'Alene, 521 U.S. at 281.

91. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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the program, 92 the underlying idea of commandeering-that state
governmental operations have constitutionally guaranteed protection
from federal interference-might well inform a court's determination
whether federal court interference with a state-administered program
"falls on the Eleventh Amendment side of the line" by impacting the
state's own interests.
There is an irony here: since such suits could probably go forward if brought against the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), but might not be allowed against a state regulator, the result
might be less delegation to the states, on the ground that their regulatory conduct is less accountable through judicial review. This
irony has already been noted, in a slightly different context, in the
commandeering debate. 93 But the basic point is clear: after Coeur
d'Alene, even some types of prospective relief against states will be
unavailable, and the unavailable relief might well include injunctions
requiring a state to take a particular regulatory or enforcement
course.
2. Citizen suit provisions and "detailed remedial schemes"
Another way in which prospective relief may be limited is
through Seminole Tribe's discussion of legislative displacement of
Young relief. In Seminole Tribe, the Court rejected the tribe's request for injunctive relief, on the ground that the statute prescribed a
"detailed remedial scheme" that, according to the Court, implicitly
preempted whatever relief might be granted under Young.94 Of
course, the statutorily-prescribed relief was not in fact available to
the plaintiff, since Seminole Tribe also held that Article I of the Constitution did not authorize Congress to abrogate state sovereign

92. See New York, 505 U.S. at 167 (distinguishing from commandeering the
"cooperative federalism" programs in which states can choose whether or not
to become the administrators of federal regulatory programs, and explicitly
identifying the Clean Water Act and RCRA as examples of such constitutionally valid schemes).
93. See, e.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 959 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Court's resolution of the commandeering issue has the perverse effect of
encouraging the federal government to aggrandize itself by increasing its own
law enforcement network rather than relying on that of the states).
94. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996).
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immunity.95 But since Congress was operating under a different
constitutional rule when it enacted the statute, 9 6 the Seminole Tribe
Court read the statutory grant of relief to reflect Congress's judgment
on the appropriate amount and type of relief available against a state,
to the implicit exclusion of other types of relief, such as that available in an Exparte Young suit.
The question is whether the citizen suit provisions in federal environmental statutes constitute the same sort of "intricate and detailed" program of relief, so as to preclude relief under Young, re97
gardless of whether that suit is brought in federal or state court.

95. See id. at 73.
96. The IGRA was enacted in 1988, one year before the Court decided in
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), that Article I gave Congress authority to abrogate state sovereignty. The Union Gas plurality suggested that its holding was a logical conclusion from prior cases. See id. at 14
(citing an "unmistakable trail" of precedent), while the Seminole Tribe Court
characterized it as a "solitary departure" from settled law. Seminole Tribe, 517
U.S. at 66. Regardless, the issue in Union Gas was clearly not definitively
settled in 1988; thus, the drafters of the IGRA may have reasonably concluded
that they did, in fact, have the authority to impose the remedial scheme they
enacted into law.
97. An important threshold issue here is whether citizen suit provisions in
federal environmental law authorize suit in state court. The general rule presumes concurrent state court jurisdiction over federal causes of action. See,
e.g., Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458-60 (1990). For jurisdiction to be
properly divested, the Court has required "'an explicit statutory directive, [an]
unmistakable implication from legislative history, or... a clear incompatibility
between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests."' Id. at 459-60 (quoting
Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981)). In Davis v.
Sun Oil Co., 148 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1018 (1998),
the Sixth Circuit concluded that RCRA's citizen suit provision did not provide
for exclusive federal jurisdiction. The relevant part of RCRA's citizen suit
provision-dealing with jurisdiction-is essentially identical to the corresponding parts of most other citizen suit provisions. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §
6972(a):
Any action under paragraph (a)(1) of this subsection shall be brought
in the district court for the district in which the alleged violation occurred or the alleged endangerment may occur. Any action brought
under paragraph (a)(2) of this subsection may be brought in the district
court for the district in which the alleged violation occurred or in the
District Court of the District of Columbia. The district court shall
have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy or the
citizenship of the parties, to enforce the permit, standard, regulation,
condition, requirement, prohibition, or order, referred to in paragraph
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The Seminole Tribe Court itself provided a partial answer, by citing
provisions of three statutes-including two environmental law stat98
utes-as examples of Congress implicitly authorizing Young relief.
One of these statutes, a provision of the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), requires that state governors take certain actions with regard to forming emergency planning
committees, and that the governor take certain emergency planning
actions if the governor does not appoint a committee to do so.99 Another environmental provision cited in Seminole Tribe is the citizen
suit provision of the Clean Water Act (CWA). 100 That provision
authorizes "any citizen" to bring a suit against "any person" (defined
to include any person or government agency or instrumentality) alleged to be in violation of a CWA effluent standard. 10 1 Finally, the
Seminole Tribe opinion cited a provision of the federal habeas corpus
statute directing, under certain circumstances, an "appropriate State
official" to turn over a record of the state
court proceedings to the
10 2
petition.
habeas
the
hearing
federal court
The Seminole Tribe Court's focus on these statutes' provision of
relief against individuals, as opposed to the state itself, suggests one
of the criteria for determining the fate of citizen suit provisions.
Most citizen suit provisions survive this first test. The important
criterion is reflected in the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision,
explicitly validated in Seminole Tribe. That provision allows suit
"against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any
(1)(A), to restrain any person who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation,
or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste referred to in paragraph
(1)(B), to order such person to take such other action as may be necessary, or both, or to order the Administrator to perform the act or duty
referred to in paragraph (2), as the case may be, and to apply any appropriate civil penalties under section 6928(a) and (g) of this title.
Cf 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994) (the Clean Air Act's citizen suit provision, similarly worded); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1999) (the Clean Water Act's citizen suit
provision, similarly worded).
98. See 517 U.S. at 75 n.17.
99. See 42 U.S.C. § 11001 (1999) (cited in Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 75
n.17).
100. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (cited in Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 75 n.17).
101. Id.
102. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(f) (1999). The Seminole Tribe Court erroneously
cited this provision as subsection (e). See 517 U.S. at 75 n.17.
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other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted
by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution)."' 0 3 That language
is repeated exactly in a large number of environmental statutes' citizen suit provisions.104 To the extent that the Seminole Tribe Court
was concerned about statutes that-like the IGRA-explicitly
authorized relief against "states," 10 5 the citizen suit provisions seem
to survive. A Ninth Circuit panel construing the Lanham Act's
civil liability provision came to the same conanalogously-worded
6

clusion.

10

But it might also be suggested that Seminole Tribe was concerned about the actual relief authorized, and not just the party
against whom it could be imposed. As noted above, the concern is
that when Congress enacts a remedy that is more limited than what
would have been available under Young, the Court should not allow
the implicitly precluded Young relief. For example, in ANR Pipeline
Co. v. Lafaver,10 7 the Tenth Circuit held that the limitations on federal court relief imposed by the Tax Injunction Act (TIA) 0 8 precluded the plaintiff from seeking relief under Young, since the TIA
imposed limits on federal jurisdiction not present under Young. By
0 9 the Seventh Circuit held that lancontrast, in Marie 0. v. Edgar,1
guage in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)" 0
that provided that a court "shall grant such relief as [it] determines is
appropriate" did not limit a federal court's remedial powers in a way

103. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a).

104. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9659; Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604
(1994); Solid Waste Disposal Act, id. § 6972; Noise Control Act, id. § 4911;
Public Health Service Act, id. § 300j-8; Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §
1540(g) (1999); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1994); see
also Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1994)
(using the same language except for the actual words "any person" and "including").
105. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 75 n.17 (noting that the IGRA's remedial scheme "repeatedly refer[s] exclusively to 'the State"').
106. See Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. v. Brown, 124 F.3d 1179, 1185 (9th
Cir. 1997).
107. 150 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 1998).
108. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
109. 131 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1997).
110. 20 U.S.C. § 1471 (1994).
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as to make Young relief inappropriate."' These two extremes-the
TIA's significant restriction on federal court relief, and the IDEA's
authorization of whatever relief the federal court thinks appropriate-bookend
the inquiry on the environmental law citizen suit pro12
visions.'

These concerns suggest that the most general citizen suit
authorizations will survive, either in federal or state court. For example, the Clean Water Act citizen suit provision, cited approvingly
in Seminole Tribe (albeit for a different proposition), 1 3 does nothing
more than to authorize suits against "any person... alleged to be in
violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation.., or (B) an order
issued ...

with respect to such a standard or limitation.... 114

turn, it authorizes courts "to enforce such an effluent standard or
limitation.., or such an order."" 5 As before, the citizen suit provisions in other environmental statutes have essentially identical language, 116 although some statutes provide the court with additional

111. Edgar, 131 F.3d at 616 (alteration in original) (quoting 20 U.S.C. §

1480(1)).
112. It bears repeating here that, even though these statutes, and the Seminole
Tribe "detailed remedial scheme" analysis to which they are subject, all deal
with federal courts, there is no reason to think that the analysis is any different
for state courts. Alden itself strongly suggests that the Eleventh Amendment
rules, Young's exception to those rules, and the limits on Young relief all apply
equally to state courts. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999). In Alden
the Court refused to extend a state's sovereign immunity to three things: suits
filed in state court against municipal corporations or other governmental entities that are not an arm of the state; "certain actions against state officers for
injunctive or declaratory relief;" and suits for monetary damages "against a
state officer in his individual capacity for unconstitutional or wrongful conduct
fairly attributable to the officer himself, so long as the relief is sought not from
the state treasury but from the officer personally." Id. at 2267. Alden extended
immunity to suits against state officers "if the suits are, in fact, against the
State." Id. at 2267.
113. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
114. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a). That provision also authorizes suits against the
EPA for failure to perform any nondiscretionary act. Since this latter authorization does not implicate the states, it should not bear on the "detailed remedial
scheme" analysis.
115. Id. The statute also authorizes the courts to order the EPA to perform
the type of nondiscretionary act which a plaintiff can also seek to enforce. See
id.
116. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(c); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8.
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authority, 17 and another statute words a similar mandate slightly differently.118 This type of relief clearly reflects congressional authorization of a Young-type suit to force the defendant to come into compliance with the federal law. The relief is not limited, but instead
implicitly provides the court with the full panoply of equitable powers necessary to "enforce" the law, as reflected in the "standard,"
"limitation," or "order." As the Court has recently stated in construing the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision, under that provision "the district court has discretion to determine which form of
relief is best suited to abate current violations and deter future
ones."'1 19 The authority in the Clean Water Act citizen suit provision-and thus, in most of the other environmental law citizen suit
provisions-does not appear anywhere near the carefully delimited
authority the Seminole Tribe Court considered in the IGRA.
B. The Relative Importance ofProspectiveand Retrospective Relief
Thus, it appears that the citizen suit provisions may well survive
Seminole Tribe-and, by extension, Alden-unscathed. But this
only protects the authority of courts to issue prospective relief, and,
indeed, as reflected in Coeur d'Alene, only certain types of prospective relief. There well may be times when such relief is ineffective in
vindicating the right at issue. The most obvious example is a state's
one-time, or otherwise completed, violation of a federal environmental law, for example, a state facility's violation of a pollution
permit due to an accidental discharge, or the one-time failure to

117. See 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (authorizing the court not merely to enforce standards or regulations, but also "to order such action as may be necessary to correct the violation, and to impose any civil penalty provided for the violation");
42 U.S.C. § 6972 (authorizing the court not just to enforce standards or regulations, but also "to restrain any person who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste... [or] to order such person to take such
other action as may be necessary").
118. See Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (authorizing courts "to restrain ... person[s] from violating such noise control requirement" that is in

effect).
119. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 693,
699 (2000). A court also has the power under the CWA to impose civil penalties. See id.
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disclose information about toxic releases. 120 Vindication of federal
law may, in these circumstances, require the type of retrospective relief--damages or fines-that is now unavailable to private party
plaintiffs who sue states. Of course, since the Court has placed separation of powers-based restrictions on plaintiffs' ability to seek fines
that go to the federal government, 21 this sort of relief might be beyond plaintiffs' grasp even absent the sovereign immunity bar. But
since those separation of powers-based restrictions may not operate
in state court proceedings, Alden's sovereign immunity bar may become even more relevant as a distinct hurdle for plaintiffs to overcome.
1. Continuing versus single violations
In order to assert a claim for injunctive relief, a plaintiff suing a
state will need to allege a continuing violation, or one that is likely to
recur in the future. Obviously, the availability of such a claim will
depend on the facts of each case. However, it might be expected
that, in order to make such allegations credible, the plaintiff will
need to allege that the violation consists not just of the one-time
transgression of a discharge limit, but, instead, consists of a systemic
breakdown within the facility's emissions control system. If the
violation can be cast at that more general level it might become easier to view the violation as ongoing
or likely to recur, thus making
1 22
appropriate.
more
injunctive relief
The other possibility here is that courts may consider injunctive
relief appropriate to enforce standards that are violated in a way that
is neither systemic nor ongoing. Most citizen suit provisions
authorize courts to "enforce" the standards or permits called for in
the statute. 123 If a court can be convinced that such enforcement
should consist of injunctive relief against the violator, even though
there is no pattern of violation or systemic flaw in the violator's

120. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
121 See id.
122. See id. at 108-09 (holding that injunctive relief would not redress the
plaintiffs injury given the one-time nature of the violation).
123. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1999) (the Clean Water Act's citizen suit
provision); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1994) (the Clean Air Act's citizen suit provision).
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emissions operations, then it might be possible to avoid Seminole
Tribe and Alden's state immunity limits on private plaintiffs. The
availability of this path is open to question, however, given the normally extraordinary nature of injunctive relief. Moreover, in Steel
Company the Court exhibited skepticism about the appropriateness
of such relief when there was no realistic possibility of the violation
recurring. 124 In that case, the Court declined to find a basis for the
plaintiffs standing in a request for injunctive relief, when the defendant had conceded that it had violated the statute, and had come into
compliance. According to the Court, a generalized interest in deterrence-presumably served by an injunction limiting the defendant's
conduct-was not enough to justify the granting of injunctive relief
in this sort of "one-shot violation" situation. 125 The Court also rejected the analogy to the mootness doctrine's principle that a case is
not mooted by the defendant's voluntary cessation of the offending
conduct. According to the Court, this theory would be unjustifiably
expanded were it to serve as the basis for arguing that a plaintiff had
standing to seek an126injunction in response to a defendant's one-time
statutory violation.
Thus, while Seminole Tribe and Alden suggest that injunctive
relief will be allowed in private party suits against states, Steel Company suggests that such injunctive relief will not be allowed in situations marked by "single-event" statutory violations, unless the plaintiff can make a credible claim that the violation is part of an ongoing
pattern, or that future violations are imminent. 127 Steel Company's
limited vision of redressability means that injunctive relief-the
main avenue for suing a state consistent with Seminole Tribe and Alden-may often not be available. The limited availability of injunctive relief, when combined with the significant role retrospective relief could conceivably play in redressing environmental violations,
means that Alden's final closing of the door to retrospective relief
looms even larger.

124. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 108-09.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 109.
127. See id. (requiring that "the allegations of future injury be particular and
concrete").
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2. The structure of the statute
Beyond the facts of the particular violation, the structure of the
statute itself may influence the degree to which injunctive relief is
available. The distinction here is between statutes primarily focused
on regulation of ongoing conduct, and those focused on creating legal liability for past conduct. 128 No environmental statute is purely
"regulatory" or purely "liability creating." Indeed, the normal approach is for a statute to regulate ongoing conduct with compliance
policed largely by the threat of liability-fines or damages-for
violating those rules. But at least one important example of a primarily "liability creating" statute exists in CERCLA, the Superfund
statute. 129 This statute may be more vulnerable than most to Seminole Tribe and Alden's restriction on retrospective relief against
states. CERCLA concerns itself with the aftermath of toxic waste
dumping, as opposed to the regulation of ongoing disposal activities
(which are regulated by the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA)). 130 Its basic structure is to make a broad range of parties linked to a toxic waste disposal site legally responsible for any
costs incurred to clean up the site, whether undertaken by an innocent party or another liable party.132 In these types of situations,
injunctive relief against a state and at the behest of the private
party 133 cleaning up the site may well be unavailable. First, the existence of a cost-recovery or a contribution remedy would presumably constitute a detailed remedial scheme that would make Young relief unavailable. 134 But even more germane to the present point, such
128. "Past conduct" is not limited to conduct that happened before the statute
was enacted, but also includes conduct that happened post-enactment but was
completed before the filing of the lawsuit.
129. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1994).
130. See id.

131. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(B) (1996).
132. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1994). The government may also order the
responsible parties to perform the actual clean up or to compensate the government for expenses incurred in performing the task. Such liability to the
government is less important from the standpoint of sovereign immunity, since
the federal government retains the constitutional authority to sue states.
133. See id.

134. Indeed, such a remedy might well be unavailable even against private

parties, on the basis of the general rule-unrelated to sovereign immunity-

that a statute's explicit provision of a particular remedy should be taken as an
implicit preclusion of other types of remedies.

See, e.g., Schweiker v.
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injunctive relief simply makes no sense in this factual context; indeed, the only type of injunction available-to participate in the
cleanup 135 -might be mooted either by the fact that the cleanup has
already been completed or by the fact that EPA has ordered the
plaintiff to do the work. In fact, it was exactly this situation-where
the federal government ordered a private party to clean up the site
and the private party sued a state to contribute financially to the cost
of the clean up-that led to Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 136 where
the Court-in a decision later overruled by Seminole Tribe-held
that Congress's Commerce Clause power included the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity.
At the other extreme, the structure of some statutes may fit quite
easily within Seminole Tribe and Alden's limits on the types of relief
private plaintiffs can seek against states. In Gwaltney of Smithfield,
Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation,137 the Supreme Court interpreted the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision to authorize suits
only against ongoing or intermittent statutory violations; citizens
could not sue for discreet violations that were completed and had no
realistic prospect of recurring. Obviously, the types of violations for
which citizens can sue under these sorts of statutes are those for
which injunctive relief is perfectly appropriate, especially given the
broad range of relief authorized (which negates the claim that the
statute falls within Seminole Tribe's detailed remedial scheme limit
138
on Young relief).
It is important, of course, not to conflate the character of the
violation (i.e., ongoing or completed) with the character of the remedy. In other words, the fact that the Clean Water Act limits citizen
suits to situations where the defendant is continuing to violate the
plicit preclusion of other types of remedies. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Chilicky,
487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988) (recommending "judicial deference to indications
that congressional inaction [in authorizing a particular remedy] has not been
inadvertent").
135. Styling the contribution remedy as injunctive relief would presumably
be rejected by a court applying the distincition between prospective and retrospective relief. Cf Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 666-67 (1974) (rejecting
the argument that monetary relief could be styled as "equitable restitution" and
thus falls within the Exparte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment).
136. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
137. 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
138. See supra notes 94-119 and accompanying text.
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statute does not necessarily mean that the only remedy that a citizenplaintiff might logically request is purely prospective. Damages
compensating the plaintiff for past harm may still be an appropriate
remedy for an ongoing violation, while fines-even if paid not to the
plaintiff but instead to the U.S. Treasury-could be viewed as deterring future conduct that could otherwise harm the plaintiff.139 Indeed, in Friends of the Earth, Inc., v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.,140 the Supreme Court recognized the deterrent value of
such "public" fines in finding those fines to redress the plaintiffs
injury caused by ongoing pollution violations.14 1 The Court's acceptance of fines as a remedy for ongoing violations only increases
their utility as remedial tools, and thus makes their unavailability in
suits against states all the more relevant to the larger question of
whether effective remedies now exist for federal law violations
committed by states.
C. The Importance ofPrivatePlaintiffs
When considering the importance of private plaintiffs in environmental law, two basic questions need to be asked. First, in general terms, how important is private enforcement of environmental
laws? And second, how important are fines and other retrospective
relief to that private enforcement?
1. Private enforcement in general
a. the state as polluterversus the state as regulator
It is impossible to give a precise answer to a question as broad
as the importance of private plaintiffs in environmental law adjudication. On the one hand, the potential exists for individual environmental law violations to have significant, almost uniquely, national
effects, thus making it more likely that there will be involvement by
the federal government or other states. Pollution that crosses state or
international borders, or adversely affects the national symbols such
139. See, e.g., Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 108 (deterring future violations by the
defendant "can of course be 'remedial' for Article III purposes, when threatened injury is one of the gravamens of the complaint").
140. 120 S. Ct. 693 (2000).
141. Id. at 698.
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as the Grand Canyon, are obvious examples. Indeed, cross-border
pollution is one of the main justifications cited for the federalization
of environmental law. 142 Moreover, the familiar "race to the bottom"
thesis, positing that states will compete with each other for business
investment by reducing environmental protection, argues for a national approach to environmental regulation, 143 as does the national
market for products that would otherwise be subject to varying state
regulations. 144 This national interest-essentially, an interest in ensuring an optimal level of environmental regulation unhindered by
competition that might lower the regulatory bar below an optimal
level- 4 5 -can be contrasted with much other regulation under the
Commerce Clause, which, while ultimately having some effect on
interstate commerce, is less
structurally national than the cross146
pollution.
of
effects
border
142. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, InternationalLaw, Global Environmentalism, and the Future of American Environmental Policy, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q.
485, 486 (1994) (noting the spillover argument); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids
of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of
National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1211-19 (1977) (listing

"the tragedy of the commons and national economies of scale," "disparities in
effective representation,.... spillovers," and "moral ideals and the politics of
sacrifice" as the driving forces behind federalization in environmental policy).
143. For a recent explanation and evaluation of the race to the bottom thesis,
see Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: ExplainingFailures in Competition Among Jurisdictionsin EnvironmentalLaw,

14 YALE J. ON REG. 67 (1996).
144. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (1999) (providing federal government with exclusive authority to promulgate emissions standards for new motor vehicles).
But see id. § 7543(b) (effectively allowing California to maintain its own emissions standards as long as they are at least as stringent as federal standards); id.
§ 7507 (allowing other states to adopt California's standards).
145. See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, "Facts Are Stubborn
Things": An Empirical Reality Check in the Theoretical Debate Over the
Race-to-the-Bottom in State Environmental Standard-Setting, 8 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 55 (1998) (describing the problem as one of optimal regulation).
146. See also, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1999) (making arson a federal offense); United States v. Jones, 178 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that the
statute did not violate the Commerce Clause when applied to the destruction of
a private residence), cert. grantedsub nom., Jones v. United States, 120 S. Ct.
494 (1999); cf, e.g., Ann Althouse, Enforcing FederalismAfter United States
v. Lopez, 38 ARIZ. L. REv. 793, 818 (1996) (contrasting the farming activity in
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), which was ultimately connected to a
national market, with the possession of guns in schools, regulated by the stat-
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But while this rationale may well help explain why environmental regulation in generalhas been largely federalized, it does not
necessarily suggest that states themselves will be the main violators,
or that the effectiveness of environmental regulation depends on its
enforceability against states. In other words, while federalization of
environmental law may have responded to the problems inhering in
the existence of different rules in different jurisdictions-i.e., by the
failure of states as regulators-itdoes not suggest that there will be
any particular problem with the states themselves acting as polluters.
Nevertheless, a more limited version of this justification does
suggest an incentive for active involvement by other states. This
more limited version relies once again on the concept of the state as
regulator,as opposed to the state as apolluter.147 To the extent that
a state violates its duties as a regulator-say, by enacting an inadequate Clean Air Act SIP, or failing to enforce it-a spillover/externalities neighboring victim state would probably suffer
substantially more damage and would have a correspondingly greater
incentive to sue than if the state was merely operating a polluting facility whose emissions traveled across state lines. 148 Thus, while
New Jersey might not have a particularly strong incentive to sue
Pennsylvania if one of Pennsylvania's government facilities pollutes
air that then travels to New Jersey, it might have a much stronger incentive to sue if Pennsylvania's SIP is so inadequate, or is enforced
so poorly, that a whole host of facilities based in that state-public or
private-pollute air that then migrates to New Jersey. While a state
regulatory plan adopted pursuant to a federal environmental statute
might well be considered federal law 149 and thus would probably be
ute struck down in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), on the ground
that the effects of the latter theory were "localized" and did "not interlock at
the national level like a market").
147. See supra Part III.A. 1.

148. Cf Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain
States in the Ozone Assessment Group for Purposes of Reducing Regional
Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356 (1998) (requiring states to modify
their Clean Air Act State Implementation Plans to minimize the interstate migration of ozone).

149. Compare, e.g., Espinosa v. Roswell Tower, Inc., 32 F.3d 491,492 (10th
Cir. 1994) (noting that the State's Clean Air Act SIP "has the force and effect
of federal law"), with Froebel v. Meyer, 13 F. Supp. 2d 843, 855 (E.D. Wis.

1998) (discussing whether a water pollution permit issued by a state authorized
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subject to Seminole Tribe and Alden's restrictions, a suit brought by a
neighboring state might not be so subject, given the special latitude
given suits0 against states brought by other states or the federal gov15

ernment.

b. the structure of the environmentalstatute
As with the importance of prospective relief, the structure of the
environmental statute at issue helps determine the importance of private party enforcement and the likelihood of government enforcement.15 1 CERCLA provides examples of situations where, depending on the provision, either the private or the government
1 52
enforcement role is paramount. Under section 106 of the statute,
the EPA may order liable parties to clean up waste sites, or to reimburse the federal government for expenses incurred in a federal
clean-up effort. The federal government-in addition to non-liable
private parties-may also sue to establish joint and several liability
for whatever clean up costs are incurred.1 53 By contrast, under section 113, liable parties can seek contribution from their fellow tortfeasors. 154 The contribution remedy in section 113 speaks much
more to private law arrangements, as joint tortfeasors sort out who is
responsible for what proportion of the total liability. By contrast,
sections 106 and 107 reflect a more important government role as
plaintiff.15 5 Thus, while sections 106 and 107 may not suffer inordinately because of Seminole Tribe or Alden, section 113 contribution
liability will clearly suffer to the extent that a state is sued as a contribution defendant. Seminole Tribe and Alden are especially problematic for a CERCLA contribution plaintiff seeking to sue a state,
since under sections 106 and 107 the EPA may impose the entire cost
of a clean-up on any one liable party, leaving that party to seek
to administer the federal Clean Water Act permit system falls under federal or

state law).
150. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2267 (1999).
151. See supra Part III.B.2.
152. 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1994).

153. See id. § 9607.
154. See id. § 9613.
155. This is especially true in light of the trend in the courts to reserve section 107 actions to innocent parties. Normally, private parties having sufficient
involvement in a waste site to incur remediation costs will not be innocent,
thus, effectively reserving section 107 actions to the federal government.
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proportionate recovery from other liable parties. 156 If those other
parties are judgment proof-or, as in this case, immune from claims
for such retrospective relief-the
third party plaintiff may be left
157
with the "orphan share."
How much does this limitation matter to CERCLA? Certainly,
any CERCLA-liable private party will be less willing to accept the
federal government's allegation that it is liable, or a government order requiring it to commence clean up, if it suspects that a state is
also a liable party but will be unable to sue that state for contribution.
The resulting reticence on the part of the private party may then harm
government enforcement by increasing litigation costs and delaying
the ultimate clean-up of the waste site. 158 Thus, even in a situation
where the government itself does not seek recovery of its costs from
a state, the absence of the state as a possible third-party defendant
impairs federal enforcement, beyond Seminole Tribe and Alden's
more direct impact159on private party plaintiffs who might wish to recover from states.
The federal government could remedy this problem simply by
shifting its enforcement focus toward the states; that is, it could
capitalize on its nearly unique power to sue states by doing so more
frequently, thus relieving private parties of the burden of being left
with joint and several liability and fewer parties to turn to for contribution defendants. Similarly, the Court in Alden stated that if the
Fair Labor Standards Act violation in that case was so important, the
156. The liability in such a case is usually, though not always, several, but
not joint and several. See William D. Araiza, Text, Purpose and Facts: The
Relationship Between CERCLA Sections 107 and 113, 72 NoTRE DAME L.
REv. 193, 206 (1996). But see Browning-Ferris Indus. of Ill. v. Ter Maat, 195
F.3d 953 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that, in some cases, CERCLA contribution
liability may be joint).
157. See Araiza, supra note 156, at 206 (discussing the "orphan share"
problem).
158. Much of this analysis is also provided in the plurality's opinion in
Pennsylvaniav. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1989) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
159. The ultimate effect of such limits on the efficient settlement of
CERCLA cases depends on the importance of the state-polluter's disposal activities at the individual site. If the state's contribution to the problem at the
site is quite small, the fact that it will not be available as a contribution defendant will play a lesser role in a private party's decision whether or not to settle
with the federal government.
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federal government could sue on behalf of the state employees that
had been denied their overtime pay. 160 Transferring this argument in
the CERCLA context-and in the context of all environmental statutes where the same dynamic can be expected-would engender the
same response that the dissenters gave in the commandeering cases:
namely, that it was a strange federalism that required the central government to disturb the normal comity existing between the states and
Washington by either preempting all state participation in the regulatory scheme or creating a larger federal enforcement apparatus in16 1
stead of relying on the state's own law enforcement resources.
Logic aside, though, it might well be asked whether such increased
federal enforcement against the states is likely. That issue is discussed later in this paper; 62 in short, though, the unique relationship
between the federal government and states suggests that such increased enforcement will not be forthcoming.
CERCLA may be a somewhat unusual example in the environmental area, as it is primarily a liability-creating statute, that is, a
statute that does not so much regulate conduct as provide a tort-like
right to compensation for past behavior. Thus, "regulation" of the
type normally done by government is somewhat less important, and
private litigation is much more important. Accordingly, CERCLA
may be more susceptible than most environmental statutes to being
severely impacted by Alden's restriction on private party lawsuits
against states.
However, at the same time, the tort-like character of CERCLA's
remedies raises a possibility for evading Alden's restrictions. In
Testa v. Katt,163 the Supreme Court held that a state court could not
discriminate against a federal law cause of action. That is, when a
state court would enforce a claim based on a particular state law
right, Testa held that the court could not refuse to hear a claim based
on an analogous federal law right. 164 This is relevant to CERCLAand potentially to other environmental laws-if it could be shown
160. See 119 S. Ct. at 2269.
161. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 959 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162. See infra Part III.C.2.b.
163. 330 U.S. 386 (1947).

164. See id. at 394.
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that a state had waived its sovereign immunity to suits against itself
alleging an analogous state law right. Thus, for example, if the state
had waived its sovereign immunity to tort claims, under Testa, the
court would have to hear the quasi-tort CERCLA contribution cause
of action.
This argument would probably fail. As Professor Jackson similarly noted,
[s]uch waivers of immunity would lay the basis for a
[Testa-like] discrimination claim if state courts refuse to
entertain analogous federal claims against states. Only if
the United States Constitution is construed as giving states
an affirmative, substantive immunity from privately enforceable federal liabilities ... could a contrary result be
165
reached.
With Alden, though, the Constitution has in fact been "construed
as giving states an affirmative, substantive immunity from privately
enforceable federal liabilities. ..."166 A fallback argument fails as
well: while in an earlier day it might have been at least plausible to
argue that the state's waiver of immunity from state law claims implicitly constituted waiver of its immunity from federal law claims,
given the state's awareness of the Testa doctrine, the current Court's
inhospitable attitude toward claims of implicit sovereign immunity
waivers 167 suggests that this response will not save the Testa argument.
One more point needs to be made. The Clean Water Act recognizes the cross-border effects of pollution in part by authorizing governors to sue when a violation in one state causes pollution in the
165. Jackson, supra note 11, at 505 n.41 (citing Carlos Manuel Vazquez,
What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683, 1717 (1997)).
166. Id.
167. See College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999) (overruling the holding of Pardenv. Terminal Ry.
of Ala. Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184 (1964), that a state's participation in interstate commerce constitutes an implicit waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity from federal court lawsuits alleging a violation of a statute regulating
interstate commerce). The fact that "a State does not consent to suit in federal
court merely by consenting to suit in the courts of its own creation," College
Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2226 (citing Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 441-45
(1900)), provides an analogy supporting what would presumably be the holding of the current Court.
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governor-plaintiff's state, without regard to the standard notice requirements normally found in citizen suit provisions. 168 But, perhaps
significantly, the statute limits its authorization to suits "against the
Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to
enforce an effluent standard or limitation ...the violation of which
is occurring in another State and is causing an adverse effect on the
public health or welfare in his State, or is causing a violation of any
water quality requirement in his State." 169 While this provision does
not authorize suits against other states, 170 the more important question is whether it implicitly precludes a governor's suit against another state under the statute's general citizen suit provision. In other
words, does this provision implicitly preclude, on a Seminole Tribe
"detailed remedial scheme" ground, the type of suit suggested above:
a suit by a governor against another state for failing to regulate properly? The answer is, "probably not," since the Court has referred to a
state's ability to sue another state as having constitutional structural
importance.' 7 1 Because of the constitutional importance of such
read that ambiguous provision
suits, it is doubtful that a court would
72
suit.'
a
such
precluding
as implicitly
2. Private enforcement seeking retrospective relief
How important is retrospective relief to private suits under environmental law? One way to approach such an admittedly broad
question is to consider the character of the statute and of the environmental problem it is designed to address. CERCLA, for example,
as primarily a liability-creating rather than a regulatory statute,
would appear to be more severely impacted by Alden's ban than statutes such as the Clean Air Act or RCRA, which aim more at
168. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(h) (1999).
169. Id.
170. The term "administrator" is not defined in the statute, see id. § 1362,
thus suggesting that it should be limited to its usual meaning, i.e., the Administrator of the EPA.
171. See, e.g., supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. Of course, such a
suit would have to be consistent with the statute's general citizen suit provision, that is, it would have to allege a "violation" of "an effluent standard or
limitation" or "an order issued... with respect to such a standard or limitation
...

."

33 U.S.C. § 1365(a).

172. It may be that such a suit would have to follow the notice provisions of
the citizen suit provision, as any other citizen suit.
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regulating ongoing activities and thus might be more readily vindicated through injunctive relief. Most environmental statutes appear
to fall within the latter category, suggesting that, at least on this
ground, most environmental statutes will retain at least some effectiveness at the behest of private party plaintiffs suing state polluters.
Obviously, damages, fines, and other retrospective relief play an
important role in regulatory statutes as well. Such relief attempts to
ensure that a violator bears the cost of the harm it has caused, or to
deter future violations, or both. Alden's restriction on such relief
naturally leads to speculation that state government violators will
simply violate the statute until an injunction forces them to stop, thus
reaping the benefit of the violation during the meantime without
having to bear the commensurate burdens. This prediction will have
to await empirical validation, but it is feasible to believe that the possibility of federal enforcement, or enforcement by other states, will
temper the temptation to "violate until enjoined," since federal or
state enforcement will continue to have damages and fines available
as remedial tools.
This latter insight leads to a major variable in determining Alden's effect: the extent to which the federal government will increase its own enforcement efforts to make up for the limitations the
Court has now placed on individuals suing states. Thinking generally about the types of suits that Alden limits yields the initial suspicion that increased federal enforcement efforts might not be forthcoming. Essentially, the type of suit that is unlikely to be brought is
one in which (1) damages or fines are necessary either in order to
motivate the plaintiff or deter future violations and (2) the federal
government chooses not to prosecute. Two distinct-though related-considerations indicate that both of these phenomena may
well be present in a significant number bf cases.
a. cooperationversus deterrencein environmental law
Recent trends in environmental enforcement suggests that, even
leaving aside the character of the defendant, the future may witness a
decline in government lawsuits seeking fines or other retrospective
penalties from polluters. Formerly, the standard method of ensuring
compliance with environmental laws was through the deterrent effects of civil or criminal law enforced by the government augmented,
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in the case of civil enforcement, by citizen-plaintiffs. But the 1990s
have witnessed the rise of a model that focuses instead on obtaining
compliance by having government cooperate with the polluter to
minimize or reduce pollution. These cooperative efforts range from
government provision of technical advice to small businesses on
matters such as emissions control or waste management, to the provision of liability protection for compliance lapses discovered in selfaudits and remedied within a short period of time. 173 The crucial
characteristic of this effort is the removal of penalties imposed for
past violations as a central feature of the enforcement program and
its replacement with methods designed to ensure future compliance
on a more or less non-coerced and self-initiated basis.
The increased focus on cooperation rather than deterrence obviously has implications for the availability of retrospective relief
against state governments that violate pollution laws. At a general
level, it suggests that government-the only entity truly able to engage in "cooperative" behavior with polluters -- may be less willing to take up the slack left by the closing of the courthouse door to
private plaintiffs seeking penalties against state governments. If
there is to be a traditional enforcement action taken by the government, the cooperative attitude reflected in this new mode of environmental enforcement suggests that it will take the form of prospective relief, for example, an injunction or (even more likely) a
consent order, rather than a penalty for past violation. Indeed, one of
the precepts of the new cooperative regulatory philosophy is that
penalties are to be used only as a threat, and are to be withdrawn
if
75
the violator presents a credible plan to comply in the future.1
b. the politics of afederal suit againsta state
Beyond this concern with government strategies to achieve optimal compliance, this reticence on the part of the federal
173. See generally Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and
the Evolving Theory ofEnvironmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181

(1998) (discussing ways to reform environmental enforcement).
174. This is the case since only the government can provide liability protection-both substantively, by changing the law, and realistically, by preempting
citizen suits-and only the government has the resources to provide a large
scale compliance assistance program.
175. See, e.g., Rechtschaffen, supra note 173, at 1188.
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government to impose penalties is presumably even greater when
dealing with state government entities. The relationship between the
federal and state governments is unique. The states exercise the re176
sidual sovereign power not delegated to the federal government,
and, just as importantly, administer a variety of federal programs under the cooperative federalism model of American government. As a
result, states stand distinct from private parties, even when both operate industrial facilities that violate federal pollution laws.' 77 Given
the special status of states, their relationship to the federal government amounts to far more than that between a regulated party and the
source of the law that regulates it. Fundamentally, that relationship
is political. For example, a state's chief executive and a majority of
its lawmakers will be active members of either the political party that
occupies the presidency or the party in opposition. As described by
prevailing constitutional doctrine, states are officially represented in
the national political process,1 78 thus suggesting that they enjoy a
constitutionally guaranteed conduit by which they can settle disagreements with the federal government.
The political nature of this relationship will undoubtedly affect
the extent to which the federal government will seek fines against
state governments. There is a significant constitutional dimension to
this dynamic. For example, Judge Weinstein, dissenting in a case
upholding the constitutionality of qui tam actions against states, concluded that such suits were unconstitutional because they disrupted
the normal politically-based process by which states and the federal
government resolved their disputes.1 79 Such disputes might still be
settled by lawsuits, but, in Judge Weinstein's view, the litigation decision had to be made by the government and not a private plaintiff.
176. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. The scope of that residual power is an
open question after the Court, in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995),
struck down for the first time in over half a century a federal law on the ground
that it exceeded Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.
177. Cf College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2230-31 (rejecting the argument
that states should be subject to suit just as private parties should to the extent
that states are acting as participants in the economic marketplace).
178. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552-56
(1985).
179. See United States ex rel. Stevens v. State of Vermont Agency of Natural
Resources, 162 F.3d 195, 208 (2d Cir. 1998) (Weinstein, J., dissenting), cert.
granted, 119 S. Ct. 2391 (1999).
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The uniquely political quality of disputes between the federal gov-

ernment and the states suggests that pure enforcement concerns will
not govern decisions about whether and how to sue. Such a view
might even be consistent with a version of the federalism vision re180

Authority,
flected in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
federal law as a matter of
which also viewed state immunity from1 81

states' political influence in Washington.
Constitutional issues aside, however, the uniqueness of the federal-state relationship means that if any polluter is going to reap the
benefits of a nonlitigation-based enforcement system, it will most
likely be state governments. The political relationship between the
various elected officials involved may well affect the decision
whether or not to sue. At the bureaucratic level, the fact that states
are the main partner in cooperative federalism 182 schemes indicates

180. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
181. See id. at 556. Of course, the "political safeguards of federalism" view
adopted in Garciawould allow the federal government to abrogate state sovereign immunity from private party lawsuits, the abrogation legislation having
been approved by Congress, within which states were thought to be represented. The type of political process check suggested by Judge Weinstein is
different; under his vision, states should be amenable to suit, at least in qui tam
actions, only by the federal government and not by private parties, in order to
preserve the fundamentally political nature of dispute resolution between the
states and the federal government. Thus, while the Garciamajority would allow the national political process-which, in the majority's view, provided the
states with a voice-to delegate enforcement of federal duties against states to
private parties, see Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), Judge
Weinstein's vision would require the federal-state political dynamic to be present at all stages of the process, from the creation of the duty (i.e., the enactment
of legislation) to its enforcement (i.e., only through litigation brought by the
federal government). See Vermont Agency of NaturalResources, 162 F.3d at
228-29 (Weinstein, J., dissenting).
182. The "cooperation" in "cooperative federalism" programs differs from
the "cooperation" referred to in the discussion of enforcement versus cooperative means of ensuring compliance- with environmental law. "Cooperative federalism" refers to the practice of enlisting state assistance in administering federal regulatory programs, among other reasons, in order to involve the state
government in making important regulatory decisions and to ensure that regulations are best tailored to the particular circumstances of the state. See generally Mark Squillace, Cooperative Federalism Under the Surface Mining Control and ReclamationAct: Is This Any Way to Run a Government?, 15 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10039 (1985) (discussing cooperative federalism under the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act).
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that they would be the entities least likely to be sued by the federal
government, especially for fines, given how such a lawsuit might
well impair that cooperation. 183 In stark contrast, individual plaintiffs who have suffered injury from violations by state entities have
no reason to refrain from suing to seek penalties even against their
own state. Most of these plaintiffs presumably have less of a stake in
the larger and longer-term direction of environmental compliance,
being more concerned with the injury to their own interests. Given
the recognized deterrent effects of fines and damages, 184 such retrospective relief might be sought even by plaintiffs with a more generalized interest in environmental protection (such as an environmental
organization). But of course, Alden shuts the door to such relief at
the behest of any private plaintiff, from an individual whose property
is damaged by state-created pollution to an environmental organization whose members have a stake in the continued existence of a
clean river. Its completion of Seminole Tribe's immunizing work
might therefore be expected to have real consequences in terms of
reducing the frequency of lawsuits seeking retrospective relief
against states.
Thus, it appears that the character of the defendant as a state entity may make it less likely that the federal government will enforce
environmental laws via lawsuits of any sort, especially those seeking
retrospective relief. When combined with the overall trend away
from such litigation-focused enforcement (regardless of the defendant), it might be thought highly unlikely that the federal government
will respond to Alden by mounting a more aggressive litigationbased enforcement strategy against the states. Especially in an age
183. The variety of levels which the federal government interacts with states
makes this statement something of an oversimplification. If the state government polluting entity is structurally distant from the state's environmental administrator or enforcing authority, then the relationship between that polluting
entity and the federal enforcement authorities will more closely resemble that
between the federal authority and a run-of-the-mill private entity. But, even
with such a structurally distant state entity, the fact remains that its status as a
state government instrumentality gives it friends in the state capitol that no private entity can match, even the largest and most effective lobbyist among
them. And this, in turn, might suffice to make it a more likely candidate for
what is sometimes alleged to be the "soft touch" of a cooperative enforcement
scheme.
184. See Laidlaw, 120 S. Ct. at 700.
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marked by at least a rhetorical commitment to devolution, decentralization, and more equal intergovernmental cooperation, such a hierarchical, nonconsensual approach to state compliance with federal law
cannot be expected as the most likely federal response to Alden.
IV.

JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO ALDEN

The above discussion suggests that there may be a fundamental
collision between two basic principles: the provision of a remedy for
every right legitimately created, and state sovereign immunity. Both
are basic to the American structure of government, and yet it is difficult to give full rein to one without trenching on the other. It may be
appropriate, then, to conclude this paper with a brief consideration of
the possibility of balancing the two. Specifically, it may be appropriate to consider balancing the importance of federal environmental
rights with state sovereign immunity.
The foundations for such balancing have already been laid. The
Court has accepted, for example, the balancing function played by
the Young fiction.1 85 In Coeur d'Alene, Justice Kennedy, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, embraced an even more explicit balancing
inquiry in Eleventh Amendment cases, advocating a case-by-case
balancing of the interests at stake when a state asserts a sovereign
immunity defense. 186 Going farther afield, the Court embraced such
a balancing as well on the broader question of whether particular
federal rights could even be created against states at all. In National
League of Cities, the Court adopted such a balancing principle when
it explained why very similar wage controls could be enforced
against the states when part of an emergency wage and price freeze,
but not when enforced as a simple feature of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 187 When part of the emergency economic action, the
185. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105

(1984) ("Our decisions repeatedly have emphasized that the Young doctrine
rests on the need to promote the vindication of federal rights."); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 106 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) ("Ex parte Young was the culmination of efforts by this Court to har-

monize the principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the effective supremacy of rights and powers secured elsewhere in the Constitution.").
186. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 270-80 (1997).
187. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852-55 (1976).
Justice Blackmun, the fifth vote for the National League of Cities holding, ex-
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federal interest was recognized
as sufficient to justify the intrusion
88
on state sovereignty.1
The question thus arises whether a balancing jurisprudence
could be engrafted onto Alden's rule of state immunity from lawsuit
in a state's own courts. The idea would be that the national interest
in enforcement of environmental law against the states outweighs the
state's interest in immunity in that area, and thus justifies limitations
189
on that immunity beyond those already recognized by the Court.
Rather than a return to National League of Cities, since the federal
law would apply against states and could be enforced in ways already recognized, this balance would instead weigh the state's interest in immunity with the national interest in private party suits seeking retrospective relief against states.
But even simply to state this idea is to recognize its difficulties.
The most obvious one, of course, is that this sort of judicial balancing requires the courts to make ad hoc judgments about matters even
more complex than those underlying the National League of Cities
calculus. These matters include the frequency and magnitude of
state violations, the deterrent effects of injunctive relief, and the
probable effectiveness of federal enforcement of environmental laws
against the states, all against a backdrop of a presumed congressional
determination that private enforcement is necessary to vindicate
rights properly created against states. Judicial deference to that legislative determination, justified as deference to the superior factfinder, risks turning the balancing rule into the familiar charade of
rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause, nothing but
a theoretical limitation that is always surmounted (or, perhaps even
worse, nearly always surmounted, save for the occasional, unpredictable, and arbitrary seeming instance when the Court would find the
federal interest insufficient). On the other hand, were the Court to
employ its balancing jurisprudence aggressively, frequently blocking
private enforcement of environmental laws against state violators, it
would be accused-fairly-of usurping the domain of the political
plicitly based his vote on the understanding that this balancing analysis was in
fact being adopted. See id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
188. See id. at 853.
189. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2267 (1999) (recognizing
Young suits, as well as suits brought by other states and by the federal government, as exceptions to the states' constitutionally-based immunity).
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branches at the behest of a nontextually-based principle applied in an
ad hoe fashion. None of this is particularly novel; the same objections could easily have been leveled against the Court's National
League of Citiesjurisprudence. And, indeed, when the Court repudiated that jurisprudence in Garcia, it noted the ad hoc quality of the
decision-making that
National League of Cities had forced lower
1 90
perform.
to
courts
If we do not trust courts to make these sorts of judgments, is
there any way to ensure vindication of federal environmental law beyond exploiting the exceptions to Seminole Tribe and Alden's rule
about state sovereign immunity? First, it should be noted that the
exceptions-the availability of injunctive relief at the behest of private parties, and the availability of retrospective relief at the behest
of other states and the federal government-are potentially powerful
weapons to ensure state compliance with federal law. This would be
especially true were the Court to reconsider its view, expressed in
Steel Company, that injunctive relief is an inappropriate response to
one-time violations. 191 But even if the Court continues to reject such
a view, consideration of one-time violations as symptomatic of
larger, ongoing patterns of conduct likely to lead to future violations
would effectively harness the power of injunctions to prevent future
damage to the environment.
Even more importantly, though, there is more than the Commerce Clause available when Congress wishes to enforce its preferences on the states, even when those preferences concern state amenability to lawsuits. Most obviously, Congress has the spending
power, which might well be construed as including the power to
condition grants to the states on the state's waiver of its immunity in
related areas. The majority and dissent in College Savings Bank discuss the Spending Clause only fleetingly. The dissent notes the significant pain that might be caused by federal withdrawal of financial
support to the state; 192 in response, the majority suggests that the
190. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 538
(1985) (discussing seemingly incomprehensible distinctions drawn by lower
courts attempting to apply NationalLeague of Cities).
191. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 108-09 (1998).
192. See College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2236 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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degree of financial inducement might in fact cross the line from legitimate pressure to improper compulsion of the state's waiver (and
thus an inappropriate use of the spending power). 193 Resolution of
the pressure-compulsion issue will have to await a further case;
clearly, though, if the Court finds a funding condition to constitute
unconstitutional coercion of a state action that the federal government could not otherwise achieve, it will have performed a major
revolution in federalism. It would be ironic if that revolution ends up
being triggered by a congressional attempt to circumvent the more
modest, though still significant, changes in the federal-state balance
wrought by Alden.
As a less controversial method of obtaining state immunity
waivers, there is no intuitive reason why Congress could not condition state participation in federal environmental programs-as, for
example, administrators of such programs-on the state's agreement
to waive its immunity from lawsuits alleging a violation of the underlying statute. There is a logic to such a requirement: if the state
is to be considered sufficiently committed to the goals of a federal
environmental program as to entrust it with the program's administration, then at the very least it should express its support for the
goals of the program by agreeing to be bound by its substantive provisions. Since the prospect of state administration of federal programs holds great attraction for states-given the flexibility and
autonomy state governments can thereby enjoy-this may be a bargain many states will accept. Conversely, it cannot reasonably be
argued that withholding federal delegation of this power to a state is
coercive. Indeed, the decision to delegate that power to a state appears far more gratuitous than the grants of revenue to which states
may have become addicted over the course of decades.
This is not to suggest that such a solution is cost-free to the federal government; it means, in fact, that the federal government will
have to shoulder the burden of administering the federal program
within any state that refuses to waive its immunity. While the prospect of having to take charge of administering plans in additional
states might suggest that the EPA would not lightly take such a step
if the decision was left to its own discretion, there is no reason that
193. See id. at2231.

1558

LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELESLAWREVIEW

[Vol. 33:1513

Congress could not simply require a state to waive its immunity as a
condition of EPA approval of a state request to administer a federal
program.
V. CONCLUSION
Alden is best understood as another step in the current Court's
movement toward both stronger state sovereign immunity and a
more rigid approach to structural relationships between various
branches of government. Just as the Court's standing jurisprudence
is moving toward a more classical model of courts as adjudicators of
individual claims and nothing more, and just as it has developed a
commandeering doctrine that hearkens back to the days of dual federalism, so too the Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence has
provided substantive content to the states' status as more than private
parties. In all of these areas the Court has rejected arguments that
interbranch relationships are more flexible and, within broad parameters, politically contingent.
The substantive protection Alden provides states requires careful
examination of the methods best suited to ensure state compliance
with federal law. That examination requires consideration of both
the structure of the particular environmental statute at issue, and the
availability and effectiveness of alternative relief, including injunctions at the behest of private parties and retrospective relief at the behest of state or federal plaintiffs. Such relief may go a long way toward limiting the damage to federal environmental policy created by
Alden's expanded vision of state immunity. However, legislative responses, from funding conditions to conditions on the state administration of federal environmental programs, may ultimately be required in order for state immunity and federal law to be more
appropriately balanced.

